WCU 경제 여름 하계세미나

Lectures, seminars are open to everyone who are interested, there is no special registration required for your participation.

Market Design and Two-Sided Matching

1.	Market Design and Two-Sided Matching	(1) Stability in one-sided matching: Resource Allocation on the basis ofpriorities. (1a) Characterization of Pareto efficient priority structures. (1b) Applications in school choice: The Boston mechanism; Indifferences inpriorities and random tie-breaking; The stable improvement cycles algorithm.
2.	Market Design and Two-Sided Matching	(1) Stability in one-sided matching: Resource Allocation on the basis ofpriorities. (1a) Characterization of Pareto efficient priority structures. (1b) Applications in school choice: The Boston mechanism; Indifferences inpriorities and random tie-breaking; The stable improvement cycles algorithm.
3.	Market Design and Two-Sided Matching	(1) Stability in one-sided matching: Resource Allocation on the basis ofpriorities. (1a) Characterization of Pareto efficient priority structures. (1b) Applications in school choice: The Boston mechanism; Indifferences inpriorities and random tie-breaking; The stable improvement cycles algorithm.